Australian Government | acma Australian Communications and Media Authority

Digital platforms' efforts under voluntary arrangements to combat disinformation and misinformation

Fifth report to government

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Executive summary

Australians' usage of digital platforms is among the highest globally, and so is our concern about online misinformation

The latest Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) annual consumer survey showed that, for the third year in a row, 98% of Australian adults use a communication or social media website/app.[1] At the same time, the 2026 Digital News Report reveals that we remain among the most concerned globally about online misinformation – with 77% of Australian adults concerned (up from 74% last year).[2]

The ACMA monitors digital platforms' activities under the self-regulatory arrangements

The ACMA oversees the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (the code), which is administered by the Digital Industry Group Inc (DIGI). With the departure of Adobe in 2026, the code currently has 7 signatories: Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Redbubble, TikTok and Twitch.

This is our fifth report to government. Recognising the significance of our reports as a longstanding input to the government's consideration of whole-of-society information integrity matters, we have taken this opportunity to consider longer-term trends. We have also taken a more concise review of signatories' efforts this year, in response to the calibre of DIGI's own review of signatories' transparency reports.

Developments in AI continues to be a key focus of signatories' reports

A key theme of this year's reporting is the implementation and enhancement of artificial intelligence (AI) tools used in moderation and enforcement of violative content, with several signatories providing greater insight into the use of AI-enabled tools as part of their enforcement and moderation systems. We encourage signatories to continue to provide qualitative and quantitative data about their use of AI, including as part of their complaints handling systems, under outcome 1d and the new outcome 1e.

Signatories also reported on the impact of other AI-related developments, including the labelling of AI-generated content and the provision of controls for end users around the inclusion of AI-generated content in their feeds. With the introduction of code outcome 1g regarding enabling users to identify AI-generated content, we look forward to more detailed reporting from signatories going forward.

Signatories did not identify any instances of coordinated inauthentic behaviour during the 2025 Australian Federal Election

This year's transparency reporting marks the first time since the code's establishment that we have data on multiple Australian federal elections. Some signatories have provided more data points in the 2025 Australian Federal Election than in 2022. The majority of signatories have reported on specific measures they undertook to safeguard the election, including elevating authoritative sources of information, partnering with news organisations to deliver media literacy campaigns, and providing data around user engagement with civic products.

[1] ACMA, *Communications and media in Australia: How we encounter misinformation*, 2026, to be published.
[2] News Media Research Centre, *Digital News Report: Australia 2026*, p153.

In line with the Australian Electoral Commission's assessment, signatories did not detect any instances of coordinated inauthentic behaviour campaigns or major content integrity escalations during the election period.

Most signatories are providing more trended Australian data and explanations for changes

Consistent with previous years, we consider the reporting of trended Australian-specific data as one of the key benchmarks for evaluating the effectiveness of signatories' measures and commitments under the code. This year's reports show that most signatories have provided a substantial proportion of Australian-specific data, with Google, Microsoft and Redbubble providing 3 years or more of datapoints across some Australian-specific datasets.

We agree with the independent reviewer that signatories should include consistent trended Australian data that is accessible and understandable without having to refer to previous reports. Larger signatories should also provide at least 2 case studies relevant to Australia during the reporting period, especially where a significant event such as an election has occurred.

Revised code and changes to governance

We support the revised code including improved reporting guidelines and new code outcomes. The ACMA welcomes DIGI's decision to keep misinformation in the scope of the revised code, alongside the introduction of new outcomes to support transparency and respond to technological advancements, as well as the continued evolution of the reporting guidelines and the code's governance.

We encourage DIGI to continue to improve code administration processes in line with our comments in this and previous reports. The temporary closure of the code complaints functionality for up to 2 months is disappointing and DIGI and signatories should effectively resource the code to support its ongoing operation.

As the code continues to evolve, the reporting guidelines would benefit from more granular quantitative data points

Concerns around signatories' changes to key metrics and how this impacts the consistency of reported data remain, as the revised guidelines do not include standardised metrics. This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of signatories' measures over time. We continue to encourage DIGI and signatories to adopt standardised metrics that would ensure consistency in how data is reported.

Introduction

In Australia, minimising the risk of harm from online disinformation and misinformation[3] on digital platforms has been the subject of industry self-regulation since 2021. The Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (the code) currently has 7 signatories: Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Redbubble, TikTok and Twitch.

In December 2019, the ACMA was tasked by the government with informal oversight over the code's development. Since that time, we have provided 4 reports to the government on the code's effectiveness. These reports are available on our website.

The code was developed by DIGI and requires signatories to identify, assess and address misinformation on their services. The code allows signatories to opt in to a range of objectives and corresponding measures to address the spread of disinformation and misinformation on their platforms, services and products. DIGI administers the code.

In September 2025, DIGI began a review of the code to consider any updates to its scope and objectives that may be appropriate in response to the shifting dis- and misinformation landscape. The ACMA provided a submission to the review, setting out our position on the code's scope, reporting framework, objectives and governance.[4] The revised code came into effect on 30 May 2026, with a number of welcome updates. We discuss these changes further below.

DIGI also published signatory transparency reports for the 2025 calendar year on its website on 10 June 2026, alongside their own annual report. These annual reports set out signatories' progress towards meeting the relevant outcomes they have signed up to in the code. Our analysis of these reports is set out below.

The government has introduced the *Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026* into Parliament. If enacted, it would require online services to take reasonable steps to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, a safe online environment. The Digital Duty of Care will not extend to misinformation and disinformation related harms.

Trends in Australia's dis- and misinformation environment

Australians' engagement with digital platforms is approaching universality. The ACMA's annual consumer survey showed that, for the third year in a row, 98% of Australian adults use a communication or social media website/app.[5]

At the same time, Australians have the highest rates of concern about misinformation online in the world, at 77%, compared with a 61% global average.[6] In the first 6 months of 2026, 76% of Australian adults reported encountering some form of online misinformation.[7]

The continued acceleration of AI technology and adoption risks diluting information integrity and user confidence in discerning authentic information and information sources online. The World Economic Forum's *Global Risks Report* for 2026 identifies adverse outcomes of AI technologies as the long-term global risk, with the largest upward trend across 33 risks surveyed. AI consequences move from the 30th rank in the 2-year outlook to the fifth rank in

[3] **Misinformation** is false or inaccurate information that is not created with the intention of causing harm. **Disinformation** is false or inaccurate information that is deliberately created and spread to harm a person, social group, organisation or country.
[4] Our submission is available on our website.
[5] ACMA, *Communications and media in Australia: How we encounter misinformation*, 2026, to be published.
[6] News Media Research Centre, *Digital News Report: Australia 2026*, p153.
[7] ACMA, *Communications and media in Australia: How we encounter misinformation*, 2026, to be published.

the 10-year forecast.[8] AI-manipulated and AI-generated content – including 'deepfakes' – fragment the online information environment, making it increasingly difficult for users to identify synthetic content. At the same time, the use of AI tools, such as chatbots for finding information, is rising – last year, 9% of Australians reported using AI chatbots for news.[9]

Key 2025 events influencing information integrity

On 14 December 2025, 2 gunmen opened fire at a Bondi Beach Hanukkah celebration, in a terrorist attack targeting Australia's Jewish community that left 15 people dead and 42 injured. In the aftermath of the attack, misinformation online wrongly identified perpetrators and fed conspiracy theories the attack was staged. Several signatories provided case studies of the Bondi Beach attack in their transparency reports, highlighting measures such as 'crisis guides' to direct users to authoritative information sources and mental health support.

The Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion was established by the Governor-General in response to the Bondi Beach attack and is ongoing. Several digital platforms have appeared before the Commission, including Google, TikTok and Meta, as have the ACMA and eSafety Commissioner. The Royal Commission is due to deliver its final report by 18 December 2026.

The federal election represented another prominent test case in Australia's information resilience in 2025. Election integrity has become increasingly intertwined with information integrity as Australians shift to online news sources. The federal election represented a second federal election case study for several signatories, with transparency reports reflecting on the continued evolution of election integrity measures, such as Election Centres and Voter Information Units, in promoting media literacy and access to authoritative information.

Objectives of the report

This report to government represents a change in approach from past reports, taking a more concise and concentrated review of the latest code transparency reports. This shift responds to the finalisation of DIGI's code review and the updated transparency reporting guidelines.

The briefer scope also reflects the code's timeframe. With the code in its sixth year of operation, there is now a substantial reporting archive to draw on for a considered assessment of the code's effectiveness. Our approach this year also recognises the strong calibre of DIGI's 2026 annual report. In light of DIGI's own assessment of individual signatory reports, the ACMA has not included its own individual feedback on signatories' reporting.

As such, this report focuses on:

- developments since our last report to government
- our analysis of emergent trends
- our views on code governance and administration.

[8] World Economic Forum, *Global Risks Report 2026*, p61.
[9] NMRC, *Digital News Report 2026*, p99.

Performance of the code in 2025

As the code enters its sixth year, signatories' reporting of their commitments under the code continues to reflect the code's flexibility in supporting transparency reporting that is adaptive and proportionate to their different services.

The ACMA acknowledges DIGI's continued improvements to its annual report,[10] which provides a comprehensive overview of key themes, particularly in relation to AI, as well as insights and developments across signatories' 2026 transparency reports. As such, we have taken a different approach to our report this year, focusing on a longitudinal assessment of data reported by signatories since the establishment of the code, including comparing signatories' reporting of the 2022 and 2025 Australian Federal Elections.

Signatories continue to report on new developments to AI policies, systems and processes

As AI technologies continue to advance rapidly, we support signatories continuing to provide transparency around changes to their AI policies, systems and processes, including reporting on new AI tools and service offerings for Australian end users.

A key theme of this year's reporting is the enhancement of AI-enabled tools for enforcement and moderation across signatories. These include:

- Microsoft expanded parts of its automated Large Language Model (LLM)-enabled comment moderation on MSN from GPT-4o to GPT-5 in 2025.
- Google's Gemini-powered tools enabled its systems to catch over 99% of policy-violating ads before they were shown and reduced incorrect advertiser suspensions by 80% in 2025. Gemini also allowed Google to process user feedback more efficiently, helping its teams to take action on 4 times as many user reports in 2025 than 2024.
- TikTok reported that it refined its automated models to allow for a broader range of enforcement actions against comments, shifting from simple removal to options like restricting visibility.
- Meta highlighted[11] it began training LLMs on its Community Standards in May 2025 to help determine whether a piece of content violated Meta's policies, automatically removing content from review queues in circumstances where Meta was highly confident it did not violate any policies. This freed up capacity for human reviewers. In December 2025, Meta provided an update on its testing of advanced AI models, which outperformed current automation and human review systems in detecting celebrity impersonations.

It is positive to see signatories continuing to provide transparency on the operation of AI tools and their impacts on enforcement and moderation systems. We encourage signatories to continue to provide qualitative and quantitative information on AI developments under outcome 1d and the new outcome 1e in future reporting, including the role of AI tools in dealing with user appeals and complaints.

[10] DIGI, Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation Annual Report, 10 June 2026
[11] On 8 August 2026, Meta provided additional information at our request.


AI and recommender systems

Another key theme in this year's reporting is the implementation of AI in user content controls and recommendations. For instance, in December 2025, Meta began rolling out a 'Your Algorithm' feature which allows users to actively view, manage and personalise the content they see on Instagram Reels by adding and removing specific interests. In November 2025, TikTok began testing a new control within 'manage topics' that allows users to choose how much AI-generated content they see in their 'For You' feeds. We encourage signatories to continue providing information on recommender systems under outcome 1f of the updated code going forward.

Labelling of AI-generated content

Consistent with previous years, signatories continue to report on improvements in the labelling of AI-generated content, including expanding disclosure of the use of AI in ads. For example, Meta began labelling images or videos created or significantly edited with AI in its advertiser marketing tools.[12] TikTok also required advertisers to label content that is completely generated or significantly modified by AI. TikTok providing a dedicated graph which shows the significant increase in the number of AI-generated videos and accounts with AI-generated videos since 2024 on its platform is a positive addition.

Figure 1: TikTok AI-generated content labelled in Australia from 2024 to 2025



[12] Meta reports that advertisers do not need to disclose when content is digitally created or altered in ways that are inconsequential or immaterial to the claim, assertion or issue raised in the ad.

Following the introduction of a new code outcome regarding labelling of AI-generated content, we expect that signatories' future transparency reports will contain further information regarding signatories' efforts in this regard.

AI literacy

The ACMA considers AI literacy to be an element of media literacy that is growing in importance. It is positive to see some signatories report on their efforts to support AI literacy, such as TikTok launching a $2 million AI literacy fund to support expert-led content about AI literacy and safety, and Meta partnering with the Australian Associated Press to develop an AI literacy video campaign aimed at enabling Australians to evaluate AI-generated content online. We encourage relevant signatories to continue to provide qualitative and quantitative information on specific media literacy measures under outcome 4.

In focus: Comparison of signatories' reporting of the 2022 and 2025 Australian Federal Election

This year's transparency reporting marks the first time that we have data on multiple Australian federal elections. Over this time, we have also seen the introduction of easily accessible and powerful generative AI tools drastically changing how information is created, disseminated and consumed. The use of AI is now firmly embedded in the global online information environment.

In its 2025 Federal Election Report, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) identified the shared challenges of operating in an evolving threat landscape, with charged political environments and decreased levels of trust in government institutions exacerbated by the growth of digital information and communication technologies. The AEC observed the use of generative AI in several ways during the 2025 Federal Election, including in political messaging and advertising. While generative AI has the potential to amplify existing threats to electoral integrity – particularly by increasing the volume and velocity of the spread of disinformation and misinformation – the AEC assessed that the use of AI did not interfere with election delivery nor was it likely to have impacted Australians' trust in the results of the 2025 Federal Election.[13]

It is positive to see the majority of signatories report on specific measures they undertook to safeguard the 2025 Australian Federal Election, including elevating authoritative sources of information on the electoral process, partnering with reputable Australian news organisations to produce resources and deliver media literacy campaigns, and providing data around user engagement of civic products. In line with the AEC's assessment, signatories did not report on any instances of coordinated inauthentic behaviour campaigns or major content integrity escalations during the election period.

In particular, Meta, Microsoft and TikTok provided a dedicated case study with both qualitative and quantitative information on their efforts to support the 2025 Federal Election. For instance, Meta partnered with the Australian Associated Press (AAP) in the lead up to the election to deliver a media literacy campaign on critical thinking skills to evaluate online content in multiple languages, which reached 823,638 people in Australia and was viewed over 5.07 million times. Meta also partnered with the AEC to deploy Voter

[13] Australian Electoral Commission, 2025 Federal Election Report, AEC website, 1 October 2025, accessed 31 July 2026.

Information Units and Election Day Reminders on Facebook and Instagram, which directed users to authoritative information about how, when and where to vote.

Meanwhile, Microsoft's Elections and Societal Resilience experts met with more than 150 people from Australia's political parties, newsrooms, academia and government to empower individuals and organisations at risk of threat actors to identify and prevent the spread of false and deceptive content. Microsoft also provided heightened threat monitoring across its services for Australian agencies during the election period.

Similarly, TikTok collaborated with the AEC and AAP to develop user-facing tools such as the Australian Election Centre, which received more than 400,000 views. TikTok also deployed an account creation prevention strategy targeting 473 name variations of high-profile politicians, political parties and government agencies to proactively reduce impersonation accounts in the lead up to the election.

In addition to this qualitative data, most signatories provided quantitative data. As this is the first year that signatories have reported on data across multiple federal elections, we are able to compare signatories' reporting on similar large-scale events. While Microsoft, Redbubble and TikTok provided more data points in this year's report on the 2025 Federal Election, we observed that Apple, Google and Meta provided more data points in their reporting of measures against the 2022 Federal Election than for the 2025 Federal Election (Table 1). We encourage relevant signatories to enhance transparency by reporting on consistent data points regarding the effectiveness of their measures over time in supporting the Australian electoral process.

Table 1: Number of data points reported by signatories for the 2022 and 2025 federal elections

	Apple	Google*	Meta	Microsoft	Redbubble	TikTok	Twitch^
Number of data points provided for the 2022 federal election	2	23	20	0	0	3	N/A
Number of data points provided for the 2025 Federal Election	0	16	7	1	4	6	0

*Includes data points reported by Google under Outcome 5 on political advertising spending for elections.
^Twitch was not a signatory of the code in 2022.

In respect of specific data sets, it is positive to see Google continuing to provide trended Australian-specific data on political advertising under Outcome 5, which includes insights into elections ad spend across 2025. We encourage Google to provide qualitative information around platform-specific measures they undertook, where applicable, in future reporting.

Apple also provided a case study around its coverage of the 2025 Federal Election, which included partnering with *The Australian* to deliver a real-time elections results experience for users. We encourage Apple to provide quantitative information of its measures, where applicable in future reporting, as it previously provided in its 2023 report covering the 2022 Federal Election.

It is also positive to see Redbubble continuing to provide transparency around monitoring of industry trends, including data points on the removal of election misinformation on its platform.

Overall, we support the move by relevant signatories to proactively report on their collaboration with the AEC to implement measures that elevate authoritative sources of information and encourage civic participation, as well as providing transparency around signatories' evolving systems to combat deceptive content and behaviours which may threaten the integrity of electoral processes.

We encourage signatories to continue reporting on their cooperation with federal electoral bodies under the updated code, as elections are an example of where case studies are useful in enhancing signatories' transparency reporting. The provision of both qualitative and quantitative information on specific measures they undertook in the lead up, during and post-elections to safeguard electoral processes, including any lessons learnt, helps stakeholders understand the effectiveness of signatories' measures. Enhanced transparency reporting of Australian-specific measures boosts trust and confidence in Australians and critically contributes to healthy civic engagement that is fundamental for a thriving democracy.

Data assessment

We acknowledge the continued efforts of signatories who have provided trended Australian-specific data and contextual information to explain any significant changes year-on-year. As Table 2 highlights, it is positive that some signatories continue to provide new data points around changes to policies, systems and processes that strengthen information integrity on their services. Since the establishment of the code, signatories have implemented moderate improvements to their reporting across the years, and this is reflected in the quality of data and contextual information in this year's transparency reports.

Table 2: Number of Australian-specific and trended datasets provided by signatories

	Apple	Google	Meta	Microsoft	Red-Bubble	TikTok	Twitch
Number of datasets	10	45	17	56	11	39	8
Number of Australia-specific datasets	4	30	12	36	10	37	2
% of datasets that are Australia-specific	40%	67%	71%	64%	91%	95%	25%
Number of datasets with 3 years or more of data points	3	17	0	43	2	0	3
Number of Australia-specific datasets with 3 years or more of data points	0	16	0	29	2	0	1
% of datasets with 3 years or more of data points that are Australia-specific	0%	94%	0%	67%	100%	0%	33%
Number of new datasets in 2026	1	7	7	2	4	16	2
Number of new Australia-specific datasets in 2026	1	0	7	1	4	15	1
% of new Australia-specific datasets in 2026	100%	0%	100%	50%	100%	94%	50%

Consistent with previous years, we consider the provision of trended Australian-specific data as one of the key benchmarks for evaluating the effectiveness of signatories' measures and commitments under the code. As Table 2 demonstrates, most signatories have provided a substantial proportion of Australian-specific data, with some signatories, including Google, Microsoft and Redbubble, providing 3 years or more of trended Australian-specific data.

We agree with the code's independent reviewer that signatories should, as a baseline, provide 3 years of trended Australian data that is clear and accessible without having to refer to previous reports. Larger signatories should also provide at least 2 case studies relevant to Australia during the reporting period, which materially enhances transparency on the effectiveness of their measures taken over the year, especially where a significant event has occurred. Smaller signatories should aim to do the same where proportionate.

Consistent with last year's reports, there continues to be a downward trend across most signatories in the amount of content actioned for misinformation in Australia. We note Meta's explanation on changes in how it reports on enforcement actions for its misinformation policy has affected the comparability of data to previous years' reporting. As such, we have excluded Meta from the figure below.

Figure 2: Content removal by digital platforms in Australia (2023–25)





Figure 3: Number of actions taken by Google Ads on violative ads in Australia



As demonstrated in Figure 3, Google Ads reported a significant increase in a doubling of the number of actions taken on violative ads in Australia since 2023. Google attributes[14] this to violations in destination requirements, such as insufficient original content, and various violations under its misrepresentation policies, such as coordinated deceptive practices, misleading representation and manipulated media.

[14] Google notes that numbers reported may fluctuate between successive reports due to various factors, including service-level changes or enhancements, changes in the number of users on a service and external events and differences in reporting periods. Therefore, report-by-report comparisons may not accurately reflect time-based improvements in Google's processes.

Transparency reporting guidelines

As an outcomes-based code, it is crucial to its success that signatories provide appropriate data and transparency to show how they are progressing to meet the code's objectives and outcomes. To support this, the Best Practice Transparency Reporting Guidelines were introduced in March 2022 to strengthen signatories' reporting, and their subsequent evolution has led to substantial improvements, which continue year-on-year.

Reviews of the Best Practice Transparency Reporting Guidelines are separate to reviews of the code. There does not appear to be a set requirement for regular review of the guidelines. Accordingly, it was an important inclusion to the scope of the 2025 code review and resulted in subsequent improvements to the guidelines.

As an outcome of the code review, an enhanced set of Best Practice Reporting Guidelines was integrated into the code, a positive result improving transparency around the reporting requirements. The revised guidelines now also outline more detailed direction for signatories in reporting against each objective and outcome, including specific quantitative data points for actions taken on violations of services' policies for disinformation and misinformation, media literacy, and the effectiveness of services' efforts to manage disinformation and misinformation. This level of detail was a positive inclusion in the guidelines. We look forward to seeing the impact of these improvements in next year's reporting.

Notably, concerns around signatories' changes to key metrics and how this impacts the consistency of data remain, as the revised guidelines do not include standardised metrics. As demonstrated by Meta's change to the scope of its misinformation policy category in this year's report, a lack of consistency makes it difficult to compare signatories' efforts, whether year-on-year for each signatory or across a period of time for all signatories. Where changes have been made, the rationale needs to be explained in reports, and we acknowledge that Meta explained that their changes were due to alignment with their report for the European Union Code of Practice on Disinformation.

Consistency is important as signatories look to report on more data each year. For government and other stakeholders, such as researchers, to make use of the data reported and assess performance, identify potential risks, and take steps to prevent or mitigate harm, the signatories must make available high-quality data that can be analysed, whether by comparison or by other means, while acknowledging the limitations of that data.

Beyond the guidelines, signatories could continue to improve their reporting through stronger internal review processes. The ACMA identified instances of data being repeated from last year's transparency reporting, visualisations being repeated in reports incorrectly, and changes in language which seemed to indicate that the definitions used for data sets had been changed. Following our requests for clarification, these signatories submitted revised transparency reports remedying their errors and providing updated data where necessary, which we understand will be made available on DIGI's website. We thank them for updating their reports. Given that the independent reviewer also commented on the number of mistakes identified through his processes, we encourage signatories to implement more robust review processes in future reports to avoid these issues being repeated.

Code governance

The ACMA acknowledges again the efforts of DIGI and signatories in strengthening the code. The code has undergone a significant evolution since its inception, including the development of the Best Practice Transparency Reporting Guidelines as noted above, and updates in 2022.

As DIGI noted in their annual report,[15] the 2025–26 review was comprehensive, resulting in a broad range of changes to the code, its administration and the transparency reporting guidelines. We strongly support misinformation remaining within the scope of the code, as well as the introduction of new code outcomes and improvements to the Best Practice Transparency Reporting Guidelines. There are remaining issues to be considered, including in respect of refining the administration of the code and further strengthening the reporting guidelines, which we outline below.

The code review

The discussion paper, published on 30 September 2025, regarding the code review raised the code's scope as the key threshold question, on the basis that misinformation is often subjective and tied to personal beliefs, while disinformation is more objectively harmful and coordinated. As our submission noted, misleading information shared without intent to cause harm can and does lead to significant harm to both users and the broader community, and is of concern to 77% of Australians.[16] Accordingly, we strongly support misinformation remains within scope of the revised code.

In addition to maintaining the scope, the code has made a range of positive improvements, including the following new outcomes:

- The new Outcome 1e, which relates to users accessing information about enforcement action taken against their accounts for violating policies in relation to mis- and disinformation. This supports greater transparency for users and accountability in relation to signatories' decision-making, which we are supportive of. Effective early resolution of users' complaints and disputes is essential to building public confidence and trust in digital platform services.
- A new Outcome 1g to support users to identify digital content that has been generated by the use of their AI systems. This was introduced due to the ACMA's request for signatories to provide further information about measures introduced to combat mis- and disinformation generated by AI, and welcome DIGI and the signatories responding affirmatively.[17] Improved labelling supports users to identify the source of the material that they are engaging with is an important part of improving Australia's information ecosystem.
- A new outcome 4a requiring signatories to work with the Australian Electoral Commission to promote electoral integrity and is an acknowledgement of the significant risk that mis- and disinformation can present to the integrity of the democratic process.

[15] DIGI, Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation Annual Report, 10 June 2026, page 22.
[16] News Media Research Centre, *Digital News Report: Australia 2026*, p153.
[17] The code, page 28.

We look forward to signatories reporting against these new outcomes in next year's transparency reports, which will offer Australians broader, more detailed insight into the signatories' work to combat mis- and disinformation.

In addition to improvements to the code, the 2025–26 review also resulted in the enhancement and integration of the Best Practice Transparency Reporting Guidelines. Previously, it had been difficult to locate the guidelines, as revised versions had been published within DIGI's annual reports, and we proposed in our submission to the review that the reporting framework be incorporated into the code. We welcome the guidelines being integrated with the code, which improves accessibility and transparency.

Code administration

The 2025–26 review resulted in several changes to code governance and administration, including the establishment of a new independent advisory committee and the frequency of reviews. There were also several matters left unclarified, including the process for transition to the new arrangements. As stated in DIGI's annual report,[18] the revised code came into effect on 30 May 2026. There is, as of 16 October 2026, no information about the process of the transition, including matters such as if and when signatories will commit to the new outcomes under the revised code and the establishment of the new independent advisory committee. The ACMA has raised concerns regarding the lack of transparency regarding significant policy and commitment changes in previous reports. This continues to be an issue, and is compounded this year by a lack of visibility as to which signatories have committed to the revised outcomes. Though it has been 4 months since the revised code came into effect, updated information has not been published to DIGI's website, beyond those signatories who provided this information in their reports following the ACMA's questions. Without clarity on code commitments, it is difficult for Australian users to understand who is covered by the code, what their obligations are, and whether they can make complaints under the code regarding these services. This lack of transparency regarding the revised code outcomes impedes the ability of stakeholders, including the ACMA, to hold signatories accountable.

Further, it is disappointing to see DIGI temporarily close the complaints facility in September 2026 for 2 months. We would encourage DIGI and signatories to effectively resource the code so this does not occur in the future.

The ACMA has also noted before that there is no process for DIGI to update the status of code signatories joining or withdrawing. This year, DIGI announced in its annual report that Adobe is no longer a code signatory, which is an improvement from the process that was followed when Legitimate withdrew from the code during the previous year. The report does not, however, indicate when Adobe withdrew. We remain of the view that regular communication and updates from DIGI between reporting cycles regarding changes to signatories would support transparency and accountability.

[18] DIGI, Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation Annual Report, 10 June 2026, page 22.

Similarly, information about the new independent advisory committee and its role has not been published to DIGI's website, beyond the brief description in DIGI's annual report.[19] We are nevertheless encouraged to see DIGI exploring opportunities for the continued evolution of the code's oversight and look forward to engaging with DIGI as the committee is established and commences its work.

[19] DIGI, Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation Annual Report, 10 June 2026, page 23.