

Investigation report

| Summary | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Entity | SpinTel Pty Ltd |
| Australian Company Number | 082 087 689 |
| Relevant Legislation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Telecommunications Act 1997</i> • <i>Telecommunications (Mobile Number Pre-Porting Additional Identity Verification) Industry Standard 2020</i> |
| Date | 1 December 2025 |

Findings

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (the **ACMA**) finds that SpinTel Pty Ltd (**SpinTel**) contravened:

- a. subsection 8(2) of the *Telecommunications (Mobile Number Pre-Porting Additional Identity Verification) Industry Standard 2020* (the **Standard**),
- b. subsection 8(5) of the **Standard**, and
- c. because of the above contraventions, subsection 128(1) of the *Telecommunications Act 1997* (the **Act**).

Table 1: Table of contraventions

| Legislation | Provision | Number of contraventions | Relevant Period |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>The Act</i> | <i>Subsection 128(1)</i> | 10 contraventions of each provision | 18 February to 17 March 2025 |
| <i>The Standard</i> | <i>Subsection 8(2)</i> | | |
| | <i>Subsection 8(5)</i> | | |

Reasons

1. The reasons for the ACMA's findings, including the key elements which establish the contraventions, are based on:
 - a. information obtained by the ACMA from the Australian Financial Crimes Exchange (**AFCX**) and cybercrimes reported to law enforcement via ReportCyber regarding alleged unauthorised ports of mobile phone numbers between August to October 2024 and between January to March 2025, for which SpinTel is identified as the gaining mobile Carriage Service Provider (**CSP**),
 - b. information obtained from SpinTel on 16 and 18 of September 2025 in response to a statutory notice (the **Notice**) given to it under section 521 of the **Act**, and
 - c. additional information obtained from SpinTel on 10 October 2025.

Background

2. The purpose of the Standard is to prevent the unauthorised porting of mobile service numbers and reduce harm to consumers arising from the unauthorised activity.
3. The Standard is an industry standard made under Part 6 of the Act. It commenced on 30 April 2020 and applies to:
 - a. mobile CSPs who supply or arrange for the supply of public mobile telecommunications services, and
 - b. every port of a mobile service number.
4. Subsection 128(1) of the Act requires CSPs to comply with standards registered under Part 6 of the Act. Accordingly, CSPs which are mobile CSPs must comply with the Standard.
5. The Standard requires that the gaining CSP, prior to initiating a port of a mobile service number, must use additional identity verification processes to confirm that the person requesting a port:
 - a. is the rights of use holder¹ (or their authorised representative) for the mobile service number to be ported, and
 - b. has access to a mobile device associated with that mobile service number.

Submissions

6. In its response to the ACMA's preliminary findings provided on 25 November 2025, SpinTel provided that:
 - a. its obligations under the Standard were not breached because unknown actors were able to [REDACTED]
 - b. it accepts the actions of the unknown actors resulted in the relevant mobile service numbers being ported without the consent of the right of use holders, and
 - c. the fact that unknown actors were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the Standard's prescribed process is not in itself a breach of the Standard by the service provider affected by the action.
7. The ACMA does not accept SpinTel's submissions. Specifically, SpinTel's arguments rest on bad actors having compromised their systems, and on a process being followed to be compliant, whereas the ACMA's view is that the process must 'confirm the requesting person is the rights of use holder of the mobile service number to be ported' to be compliant, as set out in subsection 8(2) of the Standard. Furthermore, the objectives of the Standard are specifically to prevent unauthorised porting and fraud by bad actors, and SpinTel should have had robust systems in place to ensure its processes would not be compromised.

Compliance with the Standard

Subsection 8(2) – requirement to use an additional identity verification requirement

8. Subsection 8(2) of the Standard requires that a gaining CSP must use at least one additional identity verification process, specified under paragraphs 8(2)(a)—(d) of the Standard, to confirm that the person requesting a port is the rights of use holder of the mobile service number to be ported.
9. The ACMA has considered whether SpinTel complied with subsection 8(2) of the Standard, by answering the questions set out in Table 2 below.

¹ When a customer is issued with a number in association with a telecommunications service, the customer gains the rights of use of that number.

Table 2: Assessment of compliance with subsection 8(2) of the Standard

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| <p>Is SpinTel a mobile CSP?</p> | <p>SpinTel is a mobile CSP as defined in the Standard as it:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > is a CSP as defined at section 87 of the Act, and > supplies mobile carriage services to the public. <p>Accordingly, SpinTel must comply with the Standard.</p> |
| <p>Was SpinTel the gaining CSP?</p> | <p>The Standard defines a gaining CSP as the mobile CSP to which a mobile service number has been or is to be ported.</p> <p>SpinTel was the gaining CSP for 10 investigated ports between 18 February and 17 March 2025, through its online portal.</p> |
| <p>Did SpinTel use one of the additional identity verification processes under subsection 8(2) prior to initiating a port?</p> | <p>For 10 mobile service numbers ported to SpinTel between 18 February and 17 March 2025, SpinTel did not complete any of the additional identity verification processes to accurately confirm the requesting person was the rights of use holder of the mobile service number.</p> <p>Evidence obtained from SpinTel by the ACMA indicates that the unauthorised porting occurred by an unknown actor(s) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</p> <p>Specifically, unauthorised porting occurred via the use of one or both of the following [REDACTED] [REDACTED] methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Method One: Unknown actors [REDACTED] exploit a vulnerability in Spintel’s processes [REDACTED] [REDACTED] • Method Two: Unknown actors then [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] |

10. Accordingly, the ACMA finds that SpinTel contravened subsection 8(2) of the Standard on 10 occasions.

Subsection 8(5) – requirement to not proceed with a port without verification

11. Subsection 8(5) of the Standard requires that a mobile CSP must not proceed with a mobile service number port unless one of the additional identity verification processes set out under subsections 8(2) or 8(3) of the Standard has been used by the gaining mobile CSP.

12. Subsection 8(3) of the Standard requires that where the gaining CSP is unable to confirm that the requesting person is the rights of use holder of the mobile service number to be ported, the gaining CSP can undertake an identity verification using specified documents via the process described in Schedule 1 to the Standard or subsection 8(4) in relation to a government online verification service.

13. The ACMA has considered whether SpinTel complied with subsection 8(5) of the Standard by answering the questions set out in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Assessment of compliance with subsection 8(5) of the Standard

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| Is SpinTel a mobile CSP? | Yes – refer to Table 2 above. |
| Did SpinTel use one of the additional identify verification processes under subsection 8(2)? | SpinTel did not complete any of the additional identity verification processes under subsection 8(2) for 10 mobile service numbers ported to SpinTel between 18 February and 17 March 2025 through its online portal – refer to Table 1 above. |
| Did SpinTel use one of the additional identity verification processes under subsection 8(3)? | <p>As SpinTel did not complete any identity verification checks under subsection 8(2), SpinTel must not proceed with the port without completing one of the additional identity verification processes under subsection 8(3).</p> <p>SpinTel also did not use any of the additional verification processes under subsection 8(3) for the 10 mobile service numbers ported to SpinTel between 18 February and 17 March 2025 through its online portal.</p> <p>SpinTel stated that it conducts additional identity verification checks prior to porting through use of a Document Verification Service (DVS) to complement its security and customer authorisation requirements. While this may be an additional fraud mitigation process, it is not directly relevant to compliance with subsection 8(3) of the Standard and, regardless, it did not prevent the unauthorised ports in these cases.</p> |
| Did SpinTel proceed with a port without using one of the additional verification processes at 8(2) or 8(3)? | Evidence obtained from SpinTel in response to the ACMA’s Notice indicates that SpinTel proceeded with 10 ports between 18 February and 17 March 2025 without using any of the identity verification processes at subsections 8(2) or 8(3) of the Standard to accurately confirm the requesting persons were the rights of use holders of the mobile service numbers to be ported. |

14. Accordingly, the ACMA finds that SpinTel contravened subsection 8(5) of the Standard on 10 occasions.

Compliance with the Act

15. Given the contraventions of subsections 8(2) and 8(5) of the Standard as set out above, the ACMA also finds that SpinTel contravened subsection 128(1)² of the Act on 10 occasions.

² Subsection 128(3) of the Act provides that subsection 128(1) of the Act is a civil penalty provision.